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California's Resale
Royalties Act
By PHIL MCLEOD*
Introduction
Almost all painting and sculpture that is costly in today's art
market was originally sold by its creators for a modest amount.
Yet because artists are not entitled to royalties, they share
none of their work's increased price as it passes from hand to
hand. "This complete economic separation of the artist from
his product, the latter having augmented in value over the
years, seems more the leitmotif of the art world than any other
creative medium."' A story about Robert Rauschenberg2 pro-
vides a dramatic illustration of this situation which not infre-
quently results in artists watching buyers, who purchased
their work at modest prices, make substantial and sometimes
spectacular profits on its resale. While at an auction in Los An-
geles, Rauschenberg watched Robert Scull, to whom in 1958 he
had sold his painting "Thaw," for $900.00, resell it for $85,000.00.
Rauschenberg shared none of the 9,3337 profit.3 The incident
was widely reported and drew public attention to artists' lack
of rights to resale royalties.
Providing artists royalties on profits secured on later sales of
their work that has long been accepted in Europe. This note
will first describe the highly successful French system of dis-
tributing resale royalties and go on to discuss the constitution-
ality of the California Resale Royalties Act, section 986 of the
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Under-
privileged Artist under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L SYMP. 1, 24 (1962).
2. Robert Rauschenberg (b. 1925) is one of the major artists in the schools of ab-
stract expressionism and assemblage. He has worked extensively with composer John
Cage, pianist David Tudor and choreographer Merce Cunningham. In 1966 he helped
found Experiments in Art and Technology, a collaboration of artists, scientists, and
technicians to investigate the utilization of advanced technology in the arts. BAIGELIL,
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ART 295-96 (1969).
3. R. Durry, ART LAW: REPRESENTING ARTIsTs, DEALERS, AND COILEcToRs 263, 264
(1977).
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California Civil Code, which was upheld earlier this year by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Morseburg v. Balyon.
France
Fourteen countries, including France, have adopted legisla-
tion granting artists resale royalties. Statutes vary as to the
percentage of the resale price artists receive,' the minimum
price the work must bring before the royalty is paid, the types
of resale included, and the number of years the artist is enti-
tled to a royalty. But all of them share a common rationale,
based on the factual premise that the true value of an artist's
work is usually acknowledged late in his or her life, because
the public is typically slow to recognize the merit of an artist's
work. In this sense, then, artists are supporting the public's
education while remaining poor, and resale royalties provide
recompense by allowing artists to profit when their works do
eventually become valuable in the marketplace.'
France has the oldest and probably the most effective system
of resale royalties. Known as the droit de suite (which literally
translated means "follow-up right"), both auction and private
dealer sales come under its coverage. The law requires (1) the
seller to pay the artist (or his heirs) three percent of the sale
price, (2) for up to fifty years after the artist's death, (3) re-
gardless of whether the work is sold for a profit.9
The success of France's program is due in part to its being
administered by a single agency, the Soci~th de la proprith ar-
tistique des dessins et modbles (SPADEM). Realizing that one
body would be able to coordinate and command compliance
more effectively than if responsibility were spread among sev-
eral organizations, four professional artists' associations
4. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980).
5. The fourteen countries are: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Portugal,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Luxembourg, Chile
and Uruguay. DUFFY, supra note 3, at 267-71. For an excellent discussion of the Euro-
pean system, see Note, 3 B.C. INT'L. & COMP. L. REv. 433 (1980).
6. In France, the artist receives three percent of the sale price, in Germany, only
one percent. In Italy, royalties are based solely on the work's appreciated value and a
sliding scale which increases in relationship to the sale price. DUFFY, supra note 3, at
267-71.
7. Price & Price, Rights of Artists: The Case of the Droit de Suite, in ART LAw 23
(L. DuBoff ed. 1975).
8. Id. at 24.
9. R. LERNER, REPRESENTING ARTISTs, COLLECTORS AND DEALERS 326 (1979).
-I,
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merged in 1954 to form SPADEM.10 Since then, SPADEM has
earned widespread respect and uniform cooperation among
dealers, even in Belgium and Germany, where it has reciprocal
agreements with similar agencies to collect for the resale of
works by French artists."
One of the chief objections to the droit de suite, prior to its
adoption, was that art dealers would transfer art out of the
highly active French market to other countries so as to avoid
having to pay royalties; such consequences have not resulted
and the French art market has continued to thrive. 2 Another
feared effect that has not come to fruition is that droit de suite
would drive buyers out of the art market due to the increased
costs of royalties. Overall, the French experience has shown
that royalty provisions will not dissuade art lovers from buying
art.'3
The California Resale Royalties Act
In recent years, the California legislature has passed exten-
sive legislation promoting the arts. Not surprisingly then, in
1976 it passed the Resale Royalties Act, Civil Code section 986'1
(hereinafter the Act), which is thus far the only royalty legisla-
tion passed by any state.s The Act requires the seller of a
10. SPADEM was formed through the combination of Syndicat de la proprinta ar-
tistique (founded in 1896), Socinte des auteurs et des photographes (founded in 1906),
Societt du droit d'auteur aux artistes (founded in 1910) and L'Association pour la
defense des arts plastiques et appliques en France et A l'6tranger (founded in 1922).
DuFFY, supra note 3, 267-68.
11. Duffy, Royalties for Visual Artists, 11 J. BEVERLY Huns B.A., Jan.-Feb. 1977, 27,
28.
12. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed En-
actment for the United States, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 19, 23 (1966-67).
13. Note, A Proposal for National Uniforn Art Proceeds Legislation, 53 IND. L.J.
129, 132 (1977-78).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1980).
15. The bill was in the making as early as 1974, when representatives of various
visual arts organizations asked State Senator Alan Sieroty to introduce legislation es-
tablishing a system of resale royalties for artists. Sieroty had already authored (1) the
Art in Public Buildings Act (which mandates that the governor include funds in the
state budget for art in public buildings); (2) S.B. 669, which allows artists to take tax
deductions on work donated to charity based on its fair market value; (3) the Califor-
nia Arts Preservation Act, which attempts to prevent works from being intentionally
altered or destroyed; and (4) S.B. 812, allowing local governments to modify zoning
regulations to permit artists and others to live and work in the same place. [1979] 7
STATE OF THE ARTs (CAL. ARTS CouNciL), 4. Sieroty agreed to sponsor the resale royal-
ties bill. It was then referred from the Assembly to the Assembly Finance, Insurance,
and Commerce Committee, amended three times by the Assembly, three times by the
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work of art by a living artist to pay five percent of the sale price
to the artist if that price is equal to or greater than $1,000.00 and
is not less than the amount the seller originally paid. It does
not apply to rentals, gifts, or loans, and its coverage is limited
to original works; neither multiple prints nor utilitarian works
(such as architectural drawings or antique cars) come under
its coverage. If the seller is unable to locate the artist within
ninety days of the sale, the royalty must be paid to the Califor-
nia Arts Council which will attempt to find the artist. If after
seven years the Council is unable to do so, the money will be
transferred to the Council's operating fund. The Royalties Act
applies to all sales that take place in California, as well as
those sales outside California in which the seller is a resident
of California; the residency of the buyer is irrelevant.16 Artists
cannot waive their right to royalties unless they do so in a writ-
ten contract providing for payment in an amount greater than
five percent. Failure to comply with the Act gives the artist a
cause of action for damages against the seller for three years
after the date of sale or within one year of the artist's discovery
of the sale.
Even before the California Act went into effect, critics
claimed it would be vulnerable to constitutional challenges.
Surprisingly, the statute's first court test did not come until
1978, in Morseburg v. Balyon,'7 almost two years after Gover-
nor Brown had signed the bill in 1976. Morseburg, a Los Ange-
les art dealer, sold a work by Andre Balyon in March of 1977 for
more than $1,000.00. This price exceeded his acquisition price.
Morseburg knew the whereabouts of Balyon but failed to pay
him a royalty. Morseburg also sold a work by an unlocated art-
ist, Antoine Blanchard, for more than $1,000.00, a price again
exceeding his purchase price, without paying a royalty to the
Arts Council.
Morseburg's suit challenged the Act's constitutionality. He
claimed the Act was preempted by the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution,"8 by the Copyright Act of
Senate and once more by a joint Assembly-Senate conference committee, before it was
finally passed.
16. U.C.C. § 2-401 provides that a sale takes place where the seller "completes his
performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods." Nevertheless, with-
out valid business reasons for moving the sale out of California, courts are likely to
rule against parties who have done so.
17. 201 U.S.P.Q. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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1909,19 which was in effect at the time the legislature passed the
statute, and by the Copyright Act of 1976,20 which became effec-
tive in 1978. Morseburg also charged that the Act violated both
the due process and the contracts clauses of the Constitution.2 '
The district court 22 rejected all of these claims and granted de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment.
Morseburg had argued that sections 1 and 27 of the Copy-
right Act of 1909 preempted the California Act. The relevant
portion of section 1 read: "Any person entitled thereto, upon
complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclu-
sive right: (a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the
copyrighted work."2 3 Section 27 established that a copyright is
distinct from the object, which can be transferred without the
copyright. If then stated: "[B] ut nothing in this title shall be
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy
of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been law-
fully obtained."24 In refuting the charge that the Act conflicted
with these sections, the district court held that the right to
vend only exists for the first sale of the copyrighted work and
that, because the Act only applies to resales, there was no con-
flict with the right to vend." The court stressed that because
Congress had expressed no intention to occupy the field of reg-
ulating the art market, there was no basis for concluding that
state regulation thereof was preempted by the Copyright Act
of 1909.26
The court also refused to accept the argument that the Act
deprived art owners of a property right without due process of
law,2 7 or that it violated the contracts clause. Acknowledging
that legislation with retroactive effect can be adopted by states
as long as it is reasonable and appropriate to the purpose justi-
19. Ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35 Stat. 1075-88 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979).
21. 201 U.S.P.Q. at 519-20.
22. The district court took jurisdiction of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976),
which provides that federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising
under any act of Congress relating to copyright. 201 U.S.P.Q. at 519.
23. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075.
24. Id. § 27, 35 Stat. 1082.
25. 201 U.S.P.Q. at 520.
26. Id.
27. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution forbid states from
depriving persons of their property without due process of law. Plaintiffs maintained
that the Act's retroactivity deprived those who purchased art before the statute be-
came effective of property rights without due process of law.
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fying its adoption, the court concluded that, "The public pur-
pose of promoting participation in the arts and encouraging
equitable financial treatment of artists outweighs any detri-
ment suffered by plaintiff."2 8
Morseburg took the district court's ruling to the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion.2 The Act, however, may still face court challenges to its
constitutionality since the Ninth Circuit's holding is confined
to the scope of the Copyright Act of 1909 and not the Copyright
Act of 1976, which is now in effect.
In analyzing Morseburg's preemption argument, Circuit
Judge Sneed, writing for the Ninth Circuit, noted the United
States Supreme Court's historically inconsistent posture to-
ward applying the preemption doctrine. 30 The Court, when
faced with preemption issues, has shifted from unwavering so-
licitude for state interests to consistent favor of federal inter-
ests.3' Two factors have been emphasized by the Court in
determining preemption: (1) the existence of congressional
legislation in the field, and (2) actual, as opposed to purely
speculative, conflict between the state and federal legislation.
The weight accorded each of these factors by the Court has va-
ried so enormously over the years that it has become difficult
to identify the standards which should be applied when pre-
emption claims are made. The Ninth Circuit, however, cor-
rectly turned to Goldstein v. California3 2 which satisfactorily
resolved issues analogous to those Morseburg's suit raised.
In Goldstein, petitioners were convicted of duplicating re-
cordings of major musical artists without authorization under a
state statute3 3 forbidding the transfer of any performance on
tape or record to other records or tapes with the intention of
selling the duplicates without permission of the owners of the
master recording. Petitioners contended that the Copyright
Act of 1909 established a uniform law throughout the United
States with regard to the granting of copyrights and that states
should thus be prohibited from passing laws which introduce
inconsistencies into this statutory pattern. In rejecting this
28. 201 U.S.P.Q. at 521.
29. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980).
30. Id. at 976.
31. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 CoLum. L. REV. 623, 624 (1975).
32. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
33. CAL. PEN. CODE § 653h (West 1971).
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claim, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, empha-
sized that there was no national interest which required that
federal control over the establishment of copyrights be exclu-
sive. "The subject matter to which the Copyright Clause is ad-
dressed may at times be of purely local concern. No conflict
will necessarily arise from a lack of uniform state regulation,
nor will the interest of one State be significantly prejudiced by
the actions of another."3 4 The Goldstein Court accordingly
concluded that there was no reason why California was not en-
titled to pass the legislation under which the petitioners had
been convicted.3 5
Applying some of the same reasoning in Morseburg, Judge
Sneed reasoned that the Act provided an additional right simi-
lar to the supplemental protection afforded by the California
anti-pirating statute in Goldstein, and thus concluded that the
Act was constitutional." "The fact that a resale may create a
liability to the creator artist or a state instrumentality and, at
the same time, constitute an exercise of a right guaranteed by
the Copyright Act does not make the former a legal restraint
on the latter.""
Another ground of Morseburg's challenge was that the Act
violated Article I, section 10 of the Constitution, prohibiting
states from passing any law that impairs obligation of contract.
The Act did so, Morseburg claimed, by giving the artist the
right to more money than was originally bargained for, while
giving the buyer less of the proceeds upon sale of the work,
since the buyer might pay less for a work subject to a continu-
ing resale royalty. Although subsequent buyers do indeed
have an unbargained-for obligation to pay a royalty to the crea-
tor of that work, the court held such a retroactive effect and its
concomitant impairment of contracts were not of sufficient
magnitude to prove fatal to the Act. Thus, the state legisla-
ture's determination of state need should prevail.3 8
Morseburg's objections to the Act on due process grounds re-
ceived a very brief review. The court followed United States
Supreme Court cases which firmly establish that in due proc-
ess challenges to legislation not affecting "fundamental" rights,
34. 412 U.S. at 560.
35. Id. at 570.
36. 621 F.2d at 978.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 978-79.
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the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the legislature has
acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner." Morseburg was
deemed by the court not to have carried this burden, and the
Ninth Circuit accordingly rejected that argument.
While the Ninth Circuit's holding in Morseburg is confined to
the Act's constitutionality in connection with the superseded
Copyright Act of 1909, a similar result should be reached when
the Act is challenged, as it doubtless will be, under the Copy-
right Act of 1976. Though the new Copyright Act contains fun-
damental and significant changes, including the introduction of
a single system of federal copyright protection from the mo-
ment a work reaches tangible form," there is still no language
indicating Congressional intent to occupy the field of art sales.
The Practical Effect of the California Resale
Royalties Act.
The practical effect of the Act on California artists is minor.
In the three years that have elapsed since the bill went into
effect, only a few hundred dollars have been paid to the Cali-
fornia Arts Council." The number of royalty payments pri-
vately made is impossible to calculate, but it is probably safe to
say that it is insignificant. The Act's negligible effect is due in
part to the absence of any enforcement mechanism. 43 Further-
more, few artists are able to keep track of sales of their work
once it leaves their hands. Even if they do become aware of a
sale, the small amount most royalties afford will not justify the
time, energy and cost of trying to recover." Also, since the
seller is often the artist's dealer, few artists in that situation
are willing to jeopardize the relationship by suing the errant
party.4 5
Empirical studies of the art market are extremely inade-
quate, but experts do agree that most art work has no second-
39. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); City of New Orle-
ans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. m 1979).
41. Phone interview with Les Johnson, Public Information Officer, California Arts
Council, Sacramento, California (Nov. 6, 1979).
42. [1979] 7 STATE OF THE ARTS (CA. ARTS CouNcL) 4.
43. Id.
44. Note, The Droit de Suite Has Arrived: Can It Thrive in California As It Has in
Calais, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 529, 538 (1977).
45. Solomon & Gill, Federal and State Resale Royalty Legislation* "What Hath Art
Wrought?", 26 U.C.LA. L REv. 322, 336 (1978).
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ary value and that ninety-nine percent of all contemporary art
sold for the first time declines in value." Furthermore, a great
deal of art work does not sell for more than $1,000.00, the figure
which triggers the royalty payment required under the Califor-
nia Act. For example, at the Sotheby gallery in Los Angeles,
while the 1978-79 turnover was $13.7 million, fifty percent of all
the sales were for less than $300.00.47 Another factor reducing
the economic consequences of the Act is that much art work
passes by gift or through inheritance, rather than being
purchased on the market, and thus is not subject to the Act.
The benefits of required resale royalties would manifest
themselves more if such a system were adopted at the federal
level.' If Congress passed resale royalty legislation, such a
law would doubtless include enabling legislation providing for
the creation of a central agency charged with enforcement of
the royalty system. One of the agency's functions would be to
register all art works worth over a certain dollar amount that
artists wished to have qualify for royalties. 49 Such a system of
registration, showing a work's chain of title, would provide, in
addition to a method of monitoring resales, some assurance to
collectors that the work was genuine, thus reducing the fre-
46. Note, The Droit de Suite Has Arrived, supra note 44, at 536.
47. TImE, December 31, 1979, at 50.
48. In March of 1978, Congressmen Waxman (California), Richmond (New York)
and Drinan (then representing Massachusetts) introduced H.R. 11403, the "Visual Art-
ists' Residual Rights Act of 1978," which would have created a national commission on
the visual arts to administer a resale royalties program, much as SPADEM does in
France. The commission would have been composed of five members appointed by the
President for six-year terms. Only works which artists had registered with the com-
mission would have qualified for royalties. Every time a registered work sold for more
than $1,000.00 and 105% (or more) of the price the seller had paid for the work, the
seller would have been required, within thirty days, to transmit the bill of sale and 5%
of the gross price to the commission, which would have delivered the royalty to the
artist. This royalty was to be paid until fifty years after the artist's death. In determin-
ing when the $1,000.00 threshold had been passed, property which had been part of the
purchase price was to be appraised at its fair market value and the royalty computed
accordingly. Any artist believing a seller had wrongfully withheld a royalty could have
filed a civil suit and received punitive damages of three times the royalty, up to
$5,000.00, plus attorney's fees. As expected by the bill's sponsors, who regarded its
introduction primarily as a catalyst for debating the concept of resale royalties, the bill
died in the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 124 CONG. REc. H32
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Waxman); phone interview with Bruce Wolpe,
legislative assistant to Rep. Waxman (Oct. 26, 1979).
49. A major figure in the art world, John W. Strong, has quite seriously suggested
that perhaps the best system of registration is one the American Kennel Club uses; it
is entirely voluntary and is nationally known for its accuracy. Strong & Price, Registra-
tion of Works of Art, in ART LAw, supra note 7, at 51.
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quency of forgery. The value of the work might even increase
as a result of the pedigree resulting from that chain of title.50
Such a system would undoubtedly be supported by museums
and could become the central source for accurate information
on American art.5 1 The system would allow owners to discover
other works by the same artist and their locations, information
particularly useful to those planning exhibitions.
A far more promising means of improving artists' economic
positions is the use of detailed contracts. New York attorney
Bob Projansky drafted "The Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer
and Sale Agreement"5 2 (the Projansky agreement), which is
often used as a model in discussions about artists' use of con-
tracts. The contract was drafted and revised after extensive
discussions with five hundred artists, dealers, lawyers, collec-
tors, museum people, critics, and other concerned people in-
volved in the art world." The contract gives the artist fifteen
percent of any increase in the value of each work on resale, a
record of who owns the work at any given time, the right to be
notified when the work is to be exhibited and the right to veto
the proposal, the right to borrow the work for exhibition for
two months every five years, and the right to be consulted if
any repairs become necessary.
A few artists, such as Angelo Di Benedetto, regularly use
contracts and have encountered little resistance from buyers.
He describes his general experience and feelings about the use
of contracts as follows:
[I] n 1942, I drew up a crude contract. I used this contract and
now I am in many corporate collections. ... I felt at that time
that if a person who bought my painting resold it at a profit, I
should receive fifty percent of that profit, and I am still getting
it. I found that most of my clients have felt flattered when I
have presented them with a contract... . I remember a presi-
dent of a large insurance company back East, who, upon re-
ceiving my contract, ran over to his wife and said, "I must be
buying a good thing. That artist wants me to sign a contract."54
However, critics of contractually-created resale rights believe
50. Boyers, Protection for the Artist: The Alternatives, 21 COPYRIGHT L. SymP. 124,
145 (1974).
51. Schulder, supra note 12, at 27.
52. Projansky, The Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement, in A
GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA RESALE ROYALTIEs ACT 23 (M. Price & H. Sandison ed. 1976).
53. Id.
54. Strong & Price, Registration of Works of Art, in ART LAw, supra note 7, at 72.
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contracts can only be successfully used by artists who are well
enough known to wield some bargaining power.55 That rela-
tively unknown artists may have difficulty using contracts even
with museums, which theoretically are concerned with artists'
welfare, is illustrated by an incident involving an artist whose
work had won an award from a well-known museum; the award
was the museum's purchase of the winning work for its collec-
tion. When the museum requested a bill of sale for the work,
the artist attached a copy of the Projansky agreement to the
bill. The museum refused to sign, stating the work would be
purchased only if there were no attached contract.56
Even when buyers consent to contract obligations, artists
may have trouble enforcing them.5 7 In particular, any provi-
sions which restrict the owner from selling the work without
obtaining the buyer's agreement to the contract, as required
under Article 5 of the Projansky agreement, may be held to be
a restraint on trade, since general theories of transfer of per-
sonal property grant the buyer the right to sell to whomever he
wants."
While some artists' precarious economic positions would not
be significantly improved by a federal system of resale royal-
ties, it would establish statutory recognition of their continuing
interest in their work. Once that is achieved, artists may be
able to contract more freely, thus gaining the substantial pro-
tection they need. Such developments are worthy of support,
for artists do, as Conrad wrote, "above all else . . . make us
see."59
55. Solomon & Gill, Federal and State Resale Royalty Legislation: "What Hath Art
Wrought?", supra note 45, at 329.
56. Boyers, Protection for the Artist: The Alternatives, supra note 50, at 161.
57. Solomon & Gill, Federal and State Resale Royalty Legislation: "What Hath Art
Wrought?", supra note 45, at 330.
58. Id. at 329.
59. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite, supra note 1, at 27.
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